…. Over COCOBOD CEO’s accusation against Russia, Burkina & others
Security Analyst, Colonel Festus Aboagye (RTD), has warned government appointees to be mindful of unsubstantiated accusations against neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso, since such “unfounded” claims can severely damage diplomatic relations, hinder regional cooperation, and potentially destabilise the Sahel region’s fragile security situation.
He charged that, “Ghana also ought not to orchestrate actions and behaviour that could be seen as an interference with a neighbouring state’s sovereign prerogatives, as any miscalculation could have disastrous consequences”.
Col. Aboagye’s warning, was in reference to the claims by the Chief Executive of Ghana COCOBOD, Joseph Boahen Aidoo, that the Russian military group Wagner in Burkina Faso, Niger, and other Francophone countries, is buying cocoa smuggled from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, the primary cocoa-producing countries in West Africa, implying a transnational organised crime.
The security analyst in a 6-page policy brief, shared with The Herald, stated that “Based on the available data, Ghana’s COCOBOD CEO’s claim that Russia is behind a significant intensification of cocoa smuggling to Burkina Faso, appears largely unsubstantiated. The scale of Burkina Faso’s cocoa exports is too small to account for Ghana’s reported decline in cocoa production and exports. While some smuggling may occur, insufficient evidence supports the assertion of a large-scale”.
“Russian-orchestrated operation. The claim overstates the issue and potentially serves other political or strategic purposes.
“Ghana’s claim regarding Russian involvement in cocoa smuggling to Burkina Faso, reveals a complex interplay of economic, political, and geopolitical factors.
While cocoa smuggling, remains a concern for Ghana, the scale and nature of the problem, appear to be misrepresented in the recent allegations. The analysis highlights four key points:
The volume of cocoa potentially smuggled to Burkina Faso, cannot explain Ghana’s declining cocoa production.
The claim of Russian involvement, mainly through the Wagner Group, lacks substantial evidence.
Given its numerical strength and operational commitments, the Wagner Group (Bear Brigade) cannot afford to engage in cocoa smuggling and open a chocolate factory after Russia withdrew one hundred of its paramilitary officers from Burkina Faso to help in the war in Ukraine.
The timing and nature of these allegations, could suggest possible domestic political motivations.
A Cautionary Note
Ghana’s approach to this issue raises significant concerns for its foreign relations and internal democratic governance processes:
Relations with Neighbours: Ghana must exercise caution in its accusations against neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso. If unfounded, such claims can severely damage diplomatic relations, hinder regional cooperation, and potentially destabilise the Sahel region’s fragile security situation. Ghana also ought not to orchestrate actions and behaviour that could be seen as an interference with a neighbouring state’s sovereign prerogatives, as any miscalculation could have disastrous consequences.
Geopolitical Positioning: By seemingly aligning with Western interests against Russia, Ghana risks entangling itself in broader East-West tensions. This could limit its diplomatic flexibility and potentially expose it to retaliation from global powers.
Internal Democratic Processes: The securitisation of economic issues, such as cocoa smuggling, and the proposed military deployments raise alarming questions about the potential for voter intimidation and suppression. Using external threats to justify internal military presence, especially near election periods, is a dangerous precedent that could undermine Ghana’s democratic institutions.
Economic Focus: By externalising its cocoa production challenges, Ghana risks diverting attention and resources from addressing the real internal issues affecting its cocoa sectors, such as ageing plantations, climate change impacts, and local economic policies.
“Finally, Ghana’s leadership must carefully reconsider its approach to these issues. A strategy based on diplomatic engagement, regional cooperation, and internal economic solutions would be more beneficial than one relying on unsubstantiated accusations and military interventions. Ghana’s long-term stability and prosperity depend on maintaining good relations with its neighbours, preserving its democratic integrity, and addressing economic challenges through sustainable, non-militarised approaches and good governance”, the brief stated.
Below is Col Aboahye’s statement
Policy Brief: Cocoa, Conspiracy and Conflict:
Ghana’s Dangerous Game with Burkina Faso and Russia
“You can choose your friends, but you can’t choose your neighbours”—Anon.
- Introduction and Background: Watch the Timing
On 7 September 2024, the Chief Executive of Ghana COCOBOD, Joseph BoahenAidoo, claimed that the Russian military group Wagner in Burkina Faso, Niger, and other Francophone countries, is buying cocoa smuggled from Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, the primary cocoa-producing countries in West Africa, implying a transnational organised crime.
He pointed out that because Russia was banned from entering the European market, it was resorting to cocoa smuggling. He also wondered how countries like Burkina Faso and Niger, which do not grow cocoa, could be exporting cocoa, asking, “Where are they getting it from?”
This policy brief aims to critically examine Ghana’s COCOBOD Chief Executive’s recent claim regarding Russian involvement in cocoa smuggling to Burkina Faso. It will assess the claim’s veracity, analyse its potential impacts on regional relationships and Ghana’s foreign policy, and explore the underlying motivations for making such assertions in the current political and geopolitical contexts.
- Sources and Origins of Burkina Faso’s Cocoa
The Ghanaian authorities may be correct in saying that Burkina Faso does not produce cocoa pods. Instead, it is known that cocoa produced in neighbouring countries, such as Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire, is sometimes smuggled into Burkina Faso.
Concerning West Africa’s Anglophone or Francophone countries, specific data on the amount of cocoa imported by Burkina Faso from Ghana, Togo, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria is not readily available.
However, Burkina Faso legally imports cocoa, primarily from Ghana, its major exporter; Ivory Coast, the world’s leading cocoa producer; and Nigeria, another significant cocoa producer in West Africa. These countries are the key players in the cocoa industry and contribute significantly to Burkina Faso’s cocoa imports. Burkina Faso also exports cocoa shells. According to the relatedness index, in 2022, the top export opportunities for Burkina Faso were cocoa shells (0.052) and crude petroleum (0.047).
- Burkina Faso Cocoa Exports (2020-2023)
According to the United Nations COMTRADE database on international trade, in 2020, Burkina Faso exported cocoa and cocoa preparations worth US$8.4 thousand to Mali and US$11.11 thousand in 2022, with no source data for 2021. Burkina Faso’s exports of cocoa and cocoa preparations were US$7.5 thousand in 2023. The specific data on the amount exported to Russia is not readily available.
However, this data highlights the relatively small scale of Burkina Faso’s cocoa exports during this period. Unless there has been a quantum jump in the data for 2024, the existing data does not account for Ghana’s declining cocoa production and exports.
Nevertheless, Ghana imported 2,500 tonnes of cocoa from Ivory Coast and 1,000 tonnes from Nigeria. This practice is part of an industry strategy to blend premium Ghanaian cocoa with other varieties to manage costs. Although Burkina Faso does not produce its own cocoa pods, it may not be wrong to blend premium Ghanaian cocoa with other varieties for re-export as part of its trade policy with other African or non-African countries.
- Sources and Origins of Russia’s Cocoa Imports
Russia imports cocoa beans primarily from the following countries (see Figure below):
- Estonia: $24.2 million
- Côte d’Ivoire: $11 million
- Ecuador: $2.69 million
- Belgium: $203,000
- Netherlands: $74,800
Source: Generated by Author
Only Côte d’Ivoire ($11 million) is a significant African exporter of cocoa beans to Russia. However, on 27 August 2024, Maksim Petrov, Moscow’s trade representative in Nigeria, announced Russia would begin importing cocoa beans from Nigeria.
The first-ever shipment is expected from September to October 2024. Estonia, Belgium, and the Netherlands show that non-cocoa-producing countries can export cocoa and cocoa preparations.
- Analysis
A Half-Baked Theory: Gauging the Claim’s Plausibility
From the data in sections 2 and 3, let us assume that all the US$7.5 thousand worth of cocoa Burkina Faso exported in 2023 went to Russia. That year, cocoa’s price fluctuated between approximately $1,900 and $3,692 per metric ton. Using these prices, the $7,500 worth of cocoa in 2023 would be between approximately 2.03 and 3.95 metric tons, depending on the specific price at the time of purchase.
In January 2024, COCOBOD reported struggling to achieve an average of 800,000 tons of cocoa production annually since the record 2020/2021 crop year production of 1,047,000 metric tons. According to COCOBOD, the decline has led to simmering disquiet among cocoa farmers, industry players, watchers, connoisseurs, and policymakers.
The approximately 2.03 and 3.95 metric tons of Burkina Faso’s alleged cocoa exports to Russia will be a tiny fraction of Ghana’s peak cocoa production of 1.05 thousand metric tons. The amount of cocoa smuggled will equal 0.001% of the Eiffel Tower.
Thus, the authorities cannot realistically account for Ghana’s cocoa production and export decline or attribute it to Burkina Faso’s smuggling. To strengthen their case, the authorities should have provided more concrete data on the scale of smuggling across Ghana’s land and sea borders and the proportion destined for Burkina Faso, such as “cocoa-powered tanks spotted at the border”.
The Dark Side of Chocolate: Maligning a Close Neighbour
The Ghanaian authorities were unfair to Burkina Faso in presenting it as the only culprit in smuggling Ghana’s cocoa. COCOBOD officially attributes cocoa smuggling to several factors, notably the rampant and unmitigated age-old challenge of cocoa smuggling to neighbouring Cote d’Ivoire and Togo, mainly along the Eastern and Western corridors, as well as the rampant threat of illegal small-scale mining (galamsey) causing considerable levels of devastation of productive cocoa farms.
Ghana’s claim of a Russo-Burkina conspiracy amounts to maligning a close neighbour whose collaboration in security matters is critical for national and regional security.
It is even more concerning that Ghana “snitched” on Burkina Faso when its president alleged during the US-Africa Leaders’ Summit in December 2022 that Burkina Faso had hired Russian mercenaries “…on our northern border…and entered into an arrangement to go along with Mali in employing the Wagner forces there.” That did not sit well with Burkina Faso, which summoned Ghana’s envoy to express its firm disapproval of the claim, one that superior US intelligence would have known in deeper detail than Ghana.
Stirring the Cocoa Pot: Potential Domestic Political Motivations: Extraneous Electoral Calculations?
It is justifiable to ask why this “cocoa smuggling for dummies” has become a national security threat in 2024, and military deployment will be the preferred counterstrategy. Aside from the plausibility of diverting attention from Ghana’s mismanaged cocoa sector and dwindling cocoa production, it is arguable that the securitisation of Ghana’s mismanaged agricultural sector could be calculated as a sinister agenda or “smuggling conspiracy bingo” to justify military deployment for voter intimidation and voter suppression purposes.
In late August 2024, the agriculture minister announced an immediate ban on exporting crucial grains, including rice, corn, and soy, in response to an ongoing dry spell severely affecting the country’s northern regions.
The minister also decided to deploy military personnel on the north and other borders to prevent the smuggling of grains to Burkina Faso in light of the failed rains and crops.
In the context of the above, what is intriguing about the COCOBOD CEO’s claim on 7 September is not whether it is accurate or untrue that Burkina Faso, Ghana’s neighbour north of its border, is trying to undermine one of its economic mainstays, cocoa production and export.
The timing of the claim, coming close on the heels of other orchestrations, is even more intriguing because the CEO stressed the necessity of military involvement to curb the issue of cocoa smuggling more effectively through COCOBOD’s sponsorship of the National Anti-Cocoa Smuggling Programme.
Foreign Policy Risks and Implications: Regional and Geopolitical
Ghana’s deliberate or unintentional but negligent hostile attitude to its northern neighbour and Russia can entail risks, such as:
- Deterioration of diplomatic relations with Burkina Faso, potentially exacerbating regional security cooperation
Alienation from other West African nations, if perceived as acting against regional interests
Escalation of tensions with Russia, potentially leading to economic or diplomatic retaliation
Loss of credibility on the international stage if claims are proven false or exaggerated
Diversion of attention and resources from addressing genuine issues affecting cocoa production
Potential for increased militarisation of borders, which could hamper legitimate trade and
movement despite the need for counterterrorism presence in border areas
Risk of being perceived as aligning too closely with Western interests in the ongoing global power dynamics, potentially limiting diplomatic flexibility
Possible negative impact on regional economic integration efforts if trust between neighbouring countries is eroded further after the Alliance of Sahel States’ (AES) exit from ECOWAS
There is also a potential risk of externalisation of the broader Sahel conflict, exemplified in the recent claims of Ukraine’s Military Intelligence Agency’s (GUR) involvement in operations against Russian Wagner Group forces in Mali in July 2024. This situation represented a significant expansion of the Ukraine-Russia conflict into Africa, marking a rare instance of two European adversaries engaging in proxy warfare on the continent. Its implications for regional stability, international relations, and counterterrorism efforts cannot be overemphasised.
Conclusion
Based on the available data, Ghana’s COCOBOD CEO’s claim that Russia is behind a significant intensification of cocoa smuggling to Burkina Faso appears largely unsubstantiated. The scale of Burkina Faso’s cocoa exports is too small to account for Ghana’s reported decline in cocoa production and exports. While some smuggling may occur, insufficient evidence supports the assertion of a large-scale,
Russian-orchestrated operation. The claim overstates the issue and potentially serves other political or strategic purposes.
Ghana’s claim regarding Russian involvement in cocoa smuggling to Burkina Faso reveals a complex interplay of economic, political, and geopolitical factors. While cocoa smuggling remains a concern for Ghana, the scale and nature of the problem appear to be misrepresented in the recent allegations. The analysis highlights four key points:
- The volume of cocoa potentially smuggled to Burkina Faso cannot explain Ghana’s declining cocoa production.
- The claim of Russian involvement, mainly through the Wagner Group, lacks substantial evidence.
- Given its numerical strength and operational commitments, the Wagner Group (Bear Brigade) cannot afford to engage in cocoa smuggling and open a chocolate factory after Russia withdrew one hundred of its paramilitary officers from Burkina Faso to help in the war in Ukraine.
- The timing and nature of these allegations could suggest possible domestic political motivations.
A cautionary note. Ghana’s approach to this issue raises significant concerns for its foreign relations and internal democratic governance processes:
- Relations with Neighbours: Ghana must exercise caution in its accusations against neighbouring countries, particularly Burkina Faso. If unfounded, such claims can severely damage diplomatic relations, hinder regional cooperation, and potentially destabilise the Sahel region’s fragile security situation. Ghana also ought not to orchestrate actions and behaviour that could be seen as an interference with a neighbouring state’s sovereign prerogatives, as any miscalculation could have disastrous consequences.
- Geopolitical Positioning: By seemingly aligning with Western interests against Russia, Ghana risks entangling itself in broader East-West tensions. This could limit its diplomatic flexibility and potentially expose it to retaliation from global powers.
- Internal Democratic Processes: The securitisation of economic issues, such as cocoa smuggling, and the proposed military deployments raise alarming questions about the potential for voter intimidation and suppression. Using external threats to justify internal military presence, especially near election periods, is a dangerous precedent that could undermine Ghana’s democratic institutions.
- Economic Focus: By externalising its cocoa production challenges, Ghana risks diverting attention and resources from addressing the real internal issues affecting its cocoa sectors, such as ageing plantations, climate change impacts, and local economic policies.
Finally, Ghana’s leadership must carefully reconsider its approach to these issues. A strategy based on diplomatic engagement, regional cooperation, and internal economic solutions would be more beneficial than one relying on unsubstantiated accusations and military interventions.
Ghana’s long-term stability and prosperity depend on maintaining good relations with its neighbours, preserving its democratic integrity, and addressing economic challenges through sustainable, non-militarised approaches and good governance.
