…As he extols NLA–KGL deal
Integrity and credibility are built on consistency; unfortunately, it appears that our colleagues at The Fourth Estate and the Media Foundation for West Africa (MFWA) are gradually undermining their own reputation regarding their investigative work on the NLA–KGL deal.
I say this based on the following facts: On 19 September 2025, The Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah claimed that the NLA had exchanged a prime business for a mere GHS 170 million from KGL for the year 2025.
On 9 October 2025, they reported that the NLA had received GHS 157.6 million from KGL for 2024. Yet, surprisingly, on 16 October 2025, the same Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah published that “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero.”
The question many discerning Ghanaians are asking The Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah is this: if, by their own narrative, the NLA received GHS 157.6 million from KGL in 2024, and is set to receive GHS 170 million in 2025, on what basis do they claim that “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero”?
According to their own logic, does GHS 157.6 million (2024) plus GHS 170 million (2025) amount to zero profit for the NLA?
In total, the NLA would receive GHS 327.6 million (GHS 157.6 million + GHS 170 million) from KGL for the 2024 and 2025 financial years. This figure would increase further if the monies received by the NLA from KGL in 2019, 2020, 2021, 2022, and 2023 were also included.
Furthermore, on 13 October 2025, The Fourth Estate reported that “in 2019, the first year of the NLA–KGL deal, the NLA’s profit for the State reduced to GHS 17 million.” If the NLA could make a profit of GHS 17 million in the first year of the deal, why then is The Fourth Estate now claiming that “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero”?
KGL Profit in 2024
For the avoidance of doubt, KGL made a profit of GHS 70 million in 2024 while paying GHS 157.6 million to the NLA. This clearly indicates that the NLA earned significantly more than KGL’s profit that year.
A fact-check from the Ghana Revenue Authority (GRA) also shows that KGL paid taxes in 2024 exceeding the profit it made that same year.
By the end of 2025, both the NLA and the GRA are expected to receive payments from KGL that will again exceed the company’s total profit for the year.
When The Fourth Estate began its so-called “Jandam” investigative journalism, it falsely alleged that KGL controlled a GHS 3 billion “prime business.” Yet, on 16 October 2025, the same Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah claimed that “KGL makes millions in profit while NLA makes zero.”
What an inconsistency! How can a company once described as a “billionaire KGL” now be said to be making only “millions” in profit? Such contradictions should alert the unsuspecting readers of The Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah that they are being misled by what can only be described as Jandam Journalism.
Debts of NLA Prior to the NLA–KGL Deal
From audited accounts, the NLA’s debts between 2012 and 2019 were as follows:
2012 – GHS 16,754,642.18
2013 – GHS 56,917,633.63
2014 – GHS 11,597,177.79
2015 – GHS 18,306,364.73
2016 – GHS 21,035,212.20
2017 – GHS 14,601,385.04
2018 – GHS 560,155.27
2019 – GHS 26,624,188.53
Based on these figures, it is unjustified to attribute these debts to the NLA–KGL deal. The provisional licence for the NLA–KGL partnership was signed in November 2019, and therefore did not influence debts incurred prior to that date.
The total accumulated debt of the NLA before the deal was approximately GHS 233,121,889.28, comprising:
Unpaid lotto prizes
Unpaid contractors
Unpaid withholding tax to the GRA
Unpaid SSNIT contributions
Unpaid fees to Technical Service Providers (TSPs)
Unpaid commissions to Lotto Marketing Companies
Unpaid provident fund contributions
Unpaid staff union and association deductions
Some of the NLA’s persistent challenges include:
Existing revenue-sharing agreements with TSPs (each receiving 6% of gross revenue generated through Point of Sale terminals).
A 25% commission to Lotto Marketing Companies (previously 20%).
Illegal lottery operations.
High win ratios.
No cap on the amounts staked by the public.
NLA Transfers to the Consolidated Fund
The NLA’s obligation to transfer funds to the Consolidated Fund is a political and managerial decision that has nothing to do with the NLA–KGL deal.
KGL’s responsibility is to pay its fees to the NLA in accordance with its licence agreement. What the NLA does with those funds is not KGL’s concern—just as KGL cannot dictate how the GRA uses the taxes it pays to the State.
Would anyone blame KGL if the GRA failed to remit its collected taxes to the Consolidated Fund?
Moreover, full compliance with Section 32(4) of the National Lotto Act, 2006 (Act 722), which mandates monthly transfers to the Consolidated Fund, is only possible if Section 32(3) has been fully implemented.
Section 32(3) states:
“The Authority shall pay out of the Lotto Account prize monies for winners of the National Lotto and commissions to Lotto Marketing Companies licensed by the Authority.”
This requirement must be satisfied before implementing Section 32(4). But what happens if there is no net balance left in the Lotto Account after paying:
Prize monies to winners,
Commissions to marketing companies, and
Operational and capital expenditures as stipulated in Section 50?
For political expediency, the NLA has often diverted funds meant for winners, marketing companies, and service providers in order to transfer money to the Consolidated Fund.
For example:
2012: GHS 20,000,000 transferred despite owing GHS 16,754,642.18
2013: GHS 25,000,000 transferred despite owing GHS 56,917,633.63
2014: GHS 11,850,000 transferred despite owing GHS 11,597,177.79
2015: GHS 33,270,000 transferred despite owing GHS 18,306,364.73
2016: GHS 16,000,000 transferred despite owing GHS 21,035,212.20
2017: GHS 30,000,000 transferred despite owing GHS 14,601,385.04
2018: GHS 33,927,000 transferred despite owing GHS 560,155.27
2019: GHS 16,962,000 transferred despite owing GHS 26,624,188.53
2020: GHS 22,400,495.24 transferred despite owing GHS 66,725,129.91
From 2012 to 2020, the NLA transferred a total of GHS 209,409,495.24 to the Consolidated Fund, yet within the same period owed GHS 233,121,889.28.
It is therefore baseless for The Fourth Estate and Sulemana Briamah to blame KGL Technology Limited for the NLA’s inability to transfer funds under Section 32(4) of Act 722.
Why should the NLA prioritise transfers to the Consolidated Fund when it has not settled payments to winners, contractors, service providers, and staff?
KGL’s Contributions to National Development
Between 50–70% of KGL’s profits are reinvested into Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and Corporate Social Investment (CSI) projects nationwide. Some of these initiatives include:
Construction of a multimillion-dollar ultra-modern Mental Health Facility in Kumasi, in collaboration with Otumfuo Osei Tutu II.
Renovation of the Accra Psychiatric Hospital.
Support for the Akropong School for the Blind.
Donations to flood victims in Keta.
Sponsorship of the Democracy Cup initiative by Parliament.
Sponsorship of the Ghana Football Association.
Support to the Black Stars and other national football teams.
Sponsorship of the Millennium Marathon.
Scholarships for orphans, needy, and destitute children.
GHS 2 million annually to support the NLA Good Causes Foundation.
GHS 3 million annually to the NLA–KGL Stabilisation Fund.
Refurbishment of NLA’s Draw Studio (Brennan Hall).
Funding for live lotto draws.
Numerous other CSR and CSI projects nationwide.
….. Signed….
Razak Kojo Opoku(PhD)
Former PR Manager of NLA.




