Of Ghana’s four major military coups, the one that ousted the country’s founder and first president, Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, was perhaps the most unexpected. In his book Dark Days in Ghana, originally published by Zed Books in 1968, Nkrumah detailed his final moments with some of his closest associates, expressing his shock at their betrayal. While away on an international assignment in Vietnam, Nkrumah’s political life came to an abrupt end due to the coup on February 24, 1966.
The 1966 coup, led by Colonel Emmanuel Kwasi Kotoka and Major Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa, was the first military coup in independent Ghana. In his book, Nkrumah captured his astonishment in the following excerpts, mentioning names of close men who saw him off at the airport for his last official trip as president but were secretly plotting his downfall.
Kotoka manipulated the soldiers with a fabricated story about Russian soldiers being smuggled into the country through a secret tunnel connecting the airport and Flagstaff House, the presidential residence.
Here is an extract from Dark Days in Ghana:
“I left Accra on 21st February 1966, seen off at the airport by leading government and Party officials, and service chiefs. I recall the handshakes and well-wishes from Harlley, Deku, Yakubu, and others. Unbeknownst to me, these men, smiling and ingratiating, were harboring treasonous plans. They even considered assassinating me that day but abandoned the idea.
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I remember shaking hands with Major-General Barwah, who would be murdered in cold blood three days later for refusing to surrender to the rebel soldiers. I did not realize that Zanerigu, Commander of the Presidential Guard Regiment, Kojo Botsio, Kofi Baako, and other ministers present at the airport would soon be imprisoned by renegade soldiers and policemen.
A week later, on the morning of 23rd February 1966, the garrison at Kumasi, comprising 600 men, was ordered to move to Accra. The convoy was met and halted by the two key traitors, Colonel Kotoka, recently appointed Commander of the Second Infantry Brigade Group, and Major Afrifa.
Afrifa stayed in command while Kotoka went to Accra to report progress to the Commissioner of Police, John Willie Kofi Harlley, and to find a better-known soldier to head the revolt nominally. Major-General Ankrah was chosen, although the conspirators had little regard for his abilities and had not consulted him earlier. Ankrah, despite being of mediocre calibre, held the post of second in command in the armed forces through seniority, not ability. In 1965, I retired him. His lack of understanding made him an ideal figurehead for the manipulators of the coup.
The troops were misled into believing I intended to send them to fight in Vietnam and Rhodesia and that I had deserted Ghana with £8 million. They were told there was no government left and it was their duty to assume control. Rumors of Russian planes landing in northern Ghana and a secret tunnel from Flagstaff House to Accra airport were also spread.
Kotoka and Afrifa later appeared on Ghana TV, laughing about their success and admitting they found no Russians or tunnel.
The first objective was to force Major-General Barwah, Army Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, to surrender. Brigadier Hasan, Head of Military Intelligence, Colonel Zanerigu, and Owusu-Sekyere were also targeted. Hasan was arrested, but Zanerigu escaped and warned the Presidential Guard Regiment. Barwah, however, refused to join the traitors or surrender and was shot dead by Kotoka in front of his family. The seven security officers at Barwah’s house were also murdered on Kotoka’s orders.
Kotoka boasted of his actions, claiming his “juju” protected him from Barwah’s bullets. Yet, during the April 1967 counter-coup, his magic failed, and he surrendered without protest, eventually being shot.
On 24th February, the police, acting on Harlley’s orders, rounded up most ministers and key political figures. Fighting broke out at Flagstaff House between the Presidential Guard Regiment and rebel units. Despite being outnumbered, the Guard Regiment held off the rebels, successfully defending Flagstaff House until threatened with the destruction of my family’s residence.
By 6 a.m., the Accra police had arrested key political figures, and Kotoka announced on the radio that the army and police had taken over the government. However, resistance at Flagstaff House continued until the rebels threatened to blow up my family’s residence. Kotoka’s and Afrifa’s coup set a tone of cowardice, bloodshed, and criminal stupidity.
In stark contrast, during the April 1967 counter-coup, Kotoka’s bodyguard surrendered without a fight, highlighting the ease with which a small force captured key locations, including the Castle at Osu, from which the N.L.C. governed.
Ankrah, the Chairman of the N.L.C., was the first to flee, jumping over the Castle wall and plunging into the sea.”
Dark Days in Ghana provides a vivid account of the betrayal and brutality that marked the 1966 coup, forever altering the course of Ghanaian history.
